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Science, Ethics and Civil Law*
Jean-LouisBaudouin"

Let me start by telling you how pleased and deeply honoured I am to have been
invited to give the first Tucker Lecture of the twenty first century or, if you prefer,
the last lecture of the twentieth century.
I am pleased also to be back here in Louisiana and more particularly at the
LSU Law Center. In my former life as a law professor, Ihad the distinct pleasure
of teaching here for two semesters. This was the time (1969-1970) where the
Louisiana revival ofits civilian tradition was in full swing. The late Paul M. Hebert
who was then the acting dean felt that the Louisiana State Law School (as it was
then known) had been entrusted with the unique mission ofpromoting the teaching,
as well as, the development offundamental research in civil law. With dedicated
experts such as the late Joseph Dainow, Robert Pascal, Saul Litvinoff, Thanassi
Yiannopoulos, Lee Hargrave and Bill Crawford, to mention a few, the survival and
expansion of the civil law tradition was well on its way.
I have been honoured because during that period, I had the distinct privilege
of meeting personally Colonel Tucker. I remember that I was fascinated by his
dedication to the Louisiana civil law tradition and the strength of his commitment
to it. I can still vividly remember the day when this distinguished gentleman took
me to his home for dinner and showed me his magnificent collection of old French
"coutumiers." I am very especially honoured tonight to deliver the prestigious
lecture that bears his name.
The relationship between law in general, and more particularly civil law,
science and bioethics, is both an open and an interesting question. Beyond the
traditional interrelation between morality and law, the development of medical
science has created a new perspective for us lawyers and for the science of law as
such. My theme tonight is, ofcourse, full ofvery controversial issues and I will try
to talk more in general and abstract terms, rather than to dwell on precise, yet
extremely debatable, issues such as abortion, euthanasia or embryo transplant and
farming, to mention only these three. Anyone of these themes could indeed very
well be the subject of several hours of analysis and reflection.
It is well known that medical and biological sciences have undergone
tremendous, as well as, rapid changes over the last twenty years. The expansion of
knowledge and technology has been overwhelming and accelerated. It is said that
this expansion is no longer mathematical, but geometrical. It is also believed that
particular areas of scientific knowledge have made more progress in the last 10
years than during the entire history of mankind. This is certainly true, for instance,
of human genetics.
These changes have had two different kinds ofimpact. In a number ofcases,
they have resurrected issues and problems for law and morality that had already
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been experienced before and to which society had attempted to respond, but
problems that are set, nowadays, in an entirely new and different social, legal and
ethical context. In other words, the progress of modem science and medicine in
these cases did not necessarily raise entirely new issues, but rather reactivated old
concerns although, this time, against a somewhat different cultural and societal
background. Take, for instance, the difficult problems arising out of the care of
terminally ill patients. In the history ofmankind, passive and active euthanasia, as
well as, assisted suicide have been the object ofcountless religious, philosophical,
ethical, social, legal and political discussions, in a great number of societies and in
a great variety of contexts. The Greek philosophers have abundantly discussed it
and, to refer only to modem times, the euthanatic movement in Great Britain
between World War I and World War II, the writings of Binding and Hoche in
pre-Nazi Germany and, more recently, the position taken in regard to voluntary
active euthanasia by well-known jurists and philosophers, such as Glanville
Williams, are well-known. It is also interesting to note that for the first time in
modem human history, a democratic country, The Netherlands, has allowed
voluntary active euthanasia and legislated on the subject. But in our modem setting,
the factual and analytical context of the issues raised by death and dying and the
interruption of medical treatment are substantially different from the context of
those issues only 50 years ago. New technologies such as the heart-lung support
machines, have forced ethicists and lawyers to face the new reality of cerebral and
brain death. The development of organ transplant and its increasingly higher rate
of success with the help of Cyclosporin and other immunosuppressant drugs, has
also shed a new light in that respect. The question ofthe moment at which persons
can legally be pronounced dead and their organs taken away for transplant purposes
has become crucial. Death is no longer identified with the absence ofheart beat and
spontaneous breathing, but with the total absence of cerebral activity. Moreover,
the new technology has had, as a consequence, to foster the principle of autonomy
of the person and the right to self determination and to refuse treatment.
The refinement ofpain-killers and the expansion of terminal care procedures
have also created for physicians the difficult question of how far they can go
without provoking or hastening death, while trying to alleviate pain and thus
potentially incurring criminal, as well as, civil liability.
Another example of that first kind of impact is that of AIDS. AIDS is, of
course, a recently diagnosed disease. It is, unfortunately, both epidemic and
terminal. Yet, most if not all of the ethical and legal problems it raises are wellknown and have already been previously examined in a different social context. It
is interesting, in that respect, to read the literature of the first quarter of the 20th
century, dealing with the transmission ofsyphilis and tuberculosis which were also,
at that time, both epidemic and incurable. The right to secrecy and the duty of the
physician to reveal to the consort of his patient the risk of contamination were
abundantly discussed in that literature, and the maintaining ofconfidentiality was
then the general rule. However, at least in Canada in the case of AIDS, the duty
of the physician to maintain the professional privilege of silence has now been
replaced by a duty to disclose.
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In both cases, euthanasia and AIDS, the context in which problems concerning
treatment and terminal care are raised is substantially different, because the social
and ethical values they confront are no longer the same.
By contrast, in other areas, late 20th century medicine and biology have created
a different kind of impact by raising new challenges to which society as a whole,
and thus ethics and law, will have to stand up without the benefit or the possibility
of learning from past experience. Take for instance, the difficult issues raised by
the expansion of new reproductive technologies, such as in vitro fertilization and
embryo transplant, to say nothing of surrogate motherhood. These new methods of
human reproduction have drastically challenged a number of legal rules that were
thought permanent and immutable. On a general level first,the very legitimacy of
these techniques in a society like ours has and must be seriously questioned. Law,
under one form or another, has to address the issue of their legality. For instance,
do we really want, as a society, to endorse commercialized surrogate motherhood
and to regulate surrogate contracts in the Civil Code? Are we prepared, as a
society, to accept that human embryos be kept frozen for indefinite periods oftime,
or be sold to research institutions, or given to infertile couples who have no genetic
or biological links with the future child? Can we accept, as a society, that a woman
be impregnated with the sperm ofa husband that has been dead for 10 or 15 years,
or that a manbe allowed to leave sperm in a bank and become the father ofhis great
grand-daughter? More simply, should it be legally possible to will, sell or give
away gametes like any other object or commercial product?
On a more specific level, new reproductive technologies also challenge the
traditional rules of filiation. In certain cases, a child could have three mothers: the
genetic mother, that is, the woman who gave her ovum to be fertilized, the bearing
mother, that is, the surrogate who bore the child during pregnancy and until birth,
and finally the social mother, that is, the woman to whom the child is surrendered
after birth, who has paid for the whole operation and who will raise the child as her
own.

Who, to take another example, ought the law recognize as the real mother. In
a recent California case where a woman gave an ovum which was then fertilized by
an anonymous sperm donor and reimplanted in the uterus of her female lesbian
companion who became pregnant and delivered the child, should the law recognize
that the child may have two mothers? I am certain that anyone who had seriously
argued, at the time ofBlackstone, Jeremy Bentham or Montesquieu, that there could
be such a thing as multiple motherhoods would have been found to be totally
insane.
Another area which offers a new challenge and, without any doubt, needs a
serious legal and ethical analysis is that of genetics. Our society will have, at one
point or another, to face, as with reproductive technologies, two different categories
of problers. General social and ethical ones, such as those touching upon the
legality of inter-species breeding and of genetic engineering applied to the human
person. In that respect, a burning issue will probably be how far, as a society, are
we prepared to go without endorsing eugenic policies with all the pitfalls that they
represent in terms of the biological evolution of the human race, potential
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discrimination, and the symbolic danger of the materialization ofthe eternal dream
of the "perfect human person". Others will be ofa more practical nature. The law,
for instance, already has to evaluate the admissibility in evidence, in both civil and
criminal cases, of genetic imprints and DNA expertise.
As far as both, lawyers and bioethicians are concerned, two myths must first be
dispelled. The first is that science is neutral in terms ofmoral values. Scientists
will often be heard to argue that scientific research and discoveries are never good
or bad in or by themselves, but always neutral because they deal strictly with facts,
information, and the progress ofknowledge. They conclude from it that law should
not attempt to regulate science but rather let science be its own master. This, of
course, is wrong. Science is not neutral because the impact ofscientific discoveries
on society as a whole is loaded with ethical and moral concerns. For instance, it is
not because science can now freeze human embryos that this practice should be
allowed, recognized or even encouraged. The social impacts of embryo freezing
raise several important ethical questions, one of which is, of course, the
classification of the human embryo and the identification of the protective civil
rights that it might have.
The second myth is that scientific progress is necessarily equivalent to social
progress. The syllogism in its simplest form is the following: Scientific advances
and discoveries are extraordinary and devoted to the promotion ofknowledge and
human progress; progress of mankind being both a good and ethical goal in itself,
scientific progress cannot but be good for society as a whole. This, again, is false.
Scientific progress is not in itselfa valid social and ethical goal, for it has to be
assessed carefully against possible ethical and social negative impacts it may have
on mankind. Moreover, even if it appears to be good and valid, society as a whole
may not be ready, at one point in time, to accept the consequences of a particular
biomedical progress. Quite clearly, it is not only impossible but politically
undesirable for law to sign a blank check to medical science. Law must, in this
respect, play its traditional role of assessing all the consequences of scientific
discoveries and of regulating them in the best interest of the human community as
a whole.
Medical and scientific progress, even when extremely valuable in terms of the
promotion or gathering of scientific knowledge and data, are thus not necessarily
"good" or "valid" in terms ofethical and social standards and norms. The benefits
they may bring to scientific knowledge are not necessarily compatible with social
goals, and social advancement cannot be measured only in terms of promotion of

scientific advances. These advances, like many other initiatives, must remain
compatible with larger societal goals. Take, for instance, embryo sexing which is
getting more and more popular in North America, and facilitates, for future parents
the choice of the sex of the child to be born. Imagine for one moment that there
exists a full proof technique, applicable in circumstances other than the present

ones, that is, in IVF cases, that would allow, with a high degree of consistent
predictability, to choose the sex of the future baby. Given the fact that, quite
unfortunately, in several countries around the world, such as India and China, the

birth of a male is strongly preferred and even encouraged, given also the fact that
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statistics show that North American couples, if given the choice, would tend to
prefer, for a first child, also a male, one can easily imagine that, in a matter ofone
or two generations, the delicate ratio and balance that nature had achieved between
male and female in the world could be totally upset with potential disastrous
consequences. Law may thus have to prohibit embryo sexing, not only for ethical
but also for social reasons, except in extraordinary circumstances, such as the need
for protection against a number of hereditary diseases transmissible only to a given
sex, as hemophilia, for instance.
Society and law cannot without some form of critical ethical appraisal, purely
and simply endorse the unlimited satisfaction of human fantasies and desires by
medicine and science. As a matter of fact, through our legal system, we all have the
fundamental responsibility of channeling scientific and medical developments
through the larger goal of optimal collective, societal development. Law is and
should always remain directly concerned with the effects and consequences, on
society as a whole, of the practical applications of scientific discoveries.
Taking thus for granted that law cannot stand still and simply leave scientific
progress unfettered and unregulated, the question then really becomes twofold.
First, what can the law reasonably expect to accomplish through its regulatory
process. Second, through what legal instruments should it operate.
Scientists are, of course, deeply afraid of the intervention of the law and
strongly believe that any form of regulation will have the effect of sterilizing
progress. This concern must be recognized as legitimate and any form of legal
intervention must be carefully planned and measured in terms ofrealistic goals.
We thus come now to the crux, the pith and substance, of the matter: What
shouldthe law do? What can it do and how? There are, quite frankly, no easy or
short answers to those two questions. Since at least the beginning of the 20th
century, that very issue has, indeed, been addressed by lawyers, philosophers and
ethicists. What I will attempt very modestly to do, in these few remaining minutes,
is to give you what I personallybelieve should be the general goal of the law in
regard to biomedical and technological progress.
First, the law has to strike a happy balance and a difficult course between too
much or too little intervention. On the one hand, the State, in a democratic society,
cannot, as we have seen, rely on scientists alone for self-regulation and selfdiscipline, again, because law has to preserve and promote the social order as a
whole in a permanent and evolutive way. On the other hand, it certainly ought not
to overlegislate, or even worse, overjudicialize the decision making processes of
science and medicine. I do not think, for instance, that it is for judges to routinely
decide, as a matter ofcourse, who should live and who should die when the scarcity
ofmedical resources makes it impossible to give equal treatment to all patients, or
in situations where the question is whether treatment should be administered,
withheld, or withdrawn. A large number of medical and scientific decisions are not,
in my opinion, best achieved through law and through the adversarial judicial
system, but rather through negotiation and compromise with the help of rules of
bioethics. Our legal system is based and predicated upon a binary scheme: Acts
are allowed or prohibited; a person is guilty or not guilty; the plaintiff wins or
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loses. Medical decisions do not partake ofthe same black and white and somewhat
manichean type of logics. The growing importance of clinical ethics committees
reflects that fact. It is only when and ifa conflict arises between those who have to
make the decision for instance, between the patient, the physician, and the family,
and this conflict cannot be resolved, that the impartial arbitration of a court of
justice should be called upon as a last resort measure.
In my opinion, once law has set the broad general limits ofwhat ought to be
permissible and legal and what should not be, clinical cases must defer, to a large
extent, to a decisional process that follows the rules ofbioethics. These rules, as
you know, are not universal, in fact they will vary sometimes from one hospital to
the other and lack, of course, the State's sanction. They are, as one French author
has put it, "dudroit flou." They are, however, of indisputable usefulness. My first
point then is that the intervention of the law should be carefully measured and
restricted.
Second, law is a form of tyranny in the sense that it does restrict individual
freedoms. Democratic and pluriethical societies like ours require that law should
only, in most cases, set large and flexible general norms, leaving the largest possible
margin for individual initiative and freedom. Legislative activities should, thus, all
things considered, be minimal but should nevertheless exist, because they will
determine the type of society in which our children will have to live in the future.
Third, law should not hesitate to regulate and prohibit what I would call
unacceptable exploitations or caricatural results of science. Take for instance the
rules concerning organ transplant. In Canada, there are sadly, few donors of
kidneys or other organs, and a large number of patients die every year because
surgeons are unable to recruit suitable donors. There is little doubt that a
completely free market economic model for organ donations would probably go a
long way to relieve that shortage and thus achieve a perfectly valid and ethical
result, such as the survival of a larger number of patients. Yet, I do not believe that
we are ready, at least in Canada, to accept that poor or underprivileged people be
allowed to sell their kidneys simply to pay their debts or to feed their families. The
same holds true for surrogacy which, by the way, is prohibited under Article 542 of
the Quebec Civil Code. Surrogacy, at least for financial compensation, tends, in my
opinion, to be but another form of exploitation ofwomen not in their sexual but
in their reproductive capacity.
Fourth, law has to make sure that, in the administration and supervision ofour
medical system, reasonableness, fairness and equality for all persons, in terms of
access and priorities are observed and achieved. Priorities in that respect cannot
simply be based on economic or scientific goals. It would be sad, indeed, to live
in a country where the quality of medical treatment would depend on whether one
is rich or poor, a man or a woman, caucasian or not, or on criterias that are
determined by science alone. In that respect, one cannot but be concerned and
worried by the new emerging philosophy that has appeared recently in England and
which consists of determining the availability of medical treatment for certain
categories ofpatients not by medical standards but rather by reference to their life
style. A smoker, a drinker, a person who has never exercised in his life would
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under that practice be denied medical treatment even if it could be proven to be
medically useful.
Fifth, law should not, in scientific matters, necessarily try to anticipate the
problems and react to them before they actually materialize. In certain cases,
however, the degree ofpredictability is high, and it is then better to foresee than to
remedy. This, I believe, is still the exception, however, and not the general rule,
and requires on the part of the legislator a good sense of perception and of
predictability of social effects.
To sum up, law must, first, decide what is humanly acceptable and, in that
respect, arbitrate the ever present conflict between collective and individual rights
and concerns. Second, it must generally set limits to science andfinally,through
both its legislative andjudicial processes, act as a last resort control mechanism for
individual conflicts and the repression of unacceptable ethical behavior.
Yet people, and mostly the informed public, often blame the legislator for its
silence and failure to act. The public demand for immediate legal activism is most
ofthe time voiced in terms of criminal law intervention. A good number ofcitizens
wrongly believe that the main, if not the only role of the law, is to prohibit and
punish certain forms of behavior. The control of medicine and science is thus
clearly perceived and set by them in a repressive perspective and left to criminal
law. It is often wrongly assumed that the enactment of a piece of criminal
legislation will, by magic, make the problems it addresses disappear. We lawyers
know that this assumption is both unrealistic and dangerous. Unrealistic, on the one
hand, because to be really efficient, in terms of social control, legislation must be
carefully prepared and timed, and not imposed on the people without prior public
discussion and ventilation. Hastily drafted legislation, adopted in response to a
particular crisis situation or sudden political pressure usually makes bad law.
Dangerous, on the other hand, because legislation is in itself, most of the time,
helpless to solve problems that are ofa social nature and, in that respect, legislation
that is ineffective or ineffectual brings law and the legal system as a whole into
disrepute, because it carries with it the image ofinefficiency and the risk ofbuilt-in
civil disobedience. The public, by the way, often ignores the role that the judiciary
must play in adapting known sets oflegal principles to new factual situations and
thus, generally, underestimates the impact ofjudge made law.
If one takes for granted that, in a limited number of cases, criminal law will
have to play an important role, is there also a place for the intervention of other
branches of the law? Two other branches that should not be underestimated are
administrative law and civil law.
Administrative law because through the regulatory process oflicensing clinics,
research institutions and hospitals, a great deal can be done to insure a quality
control of scientific activities and a supervisory power n of what type of research
is done. In the U.S., as well as in Canada, government funding is, by and large,
subject to strict administrative regulations. The private sector, however, which is
over expanding, especially in the area ofgenetics, should also be subject to that type
of legal control.
Civil law, on the other hand, also has a crucial role to play, and this role should
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not be .underestimated for the following reasons. The first one relates to
methodology; the second to the legislative technique itself.
As we well know, the civilian methodology is predicated upon a logical
deductive model. It first attempts to identify basic general principles that will serve
as fundamental guides to any form of legislative intervention. The merits of
applying that method in the biomedical and bioethical context are clear, in the sense
that the identification of general and abstract principles always requires a
preliminary in depth analysis of the ethical concerns that must be accommodated
and translated into law. For instance, Article 26 of the Louisiana Civil Code
concerning the patrimonial rights of the unborn child is clearly based on the
principle that the human personality, for certain purposes, starts at the very moment
of conception. This is supplemented by Sections 121-124 of Title IX of the
Louisiana Revised Statutes concerning the embryo. One can clearly identify there
the desire of the law to preserve the dignity of the human embryo as a general
principle. For instance, Article 11 of the Quebec Civil Code, which states that no
one can be made to undergo any formof medical treatment without explicit consent,
isbased on the principle of self-determination, itself a logical consequence of the
principle of autonomy. Article 25 of the same Code codifies the principle of
gratuitousness. of the alienation by an individual of a part or of a product of his
body. This, as you know, is also recognized by all ofEuropean legislations on the
subject and is clearly predicated on the principle that the human body cannot be
given the legal qualification of an economic object.
The civilian deductive approach, I believe, guarantees before any legislation
is enacted a clearer identification of fundamental principles and has the distinct
advantage of lessening considerably the risk of contradictory solutions which is
always present where the identification of those basic principles is left only to the
accumulation or sedimentation ofjudicial precedents.
The second reason why I believe that some forms ofregulation ofscience can
be best achieved through civil law relates to the type of legislation itself. As we all
know, civil law jurisdictions tend to legislate in broad general terms and avoid
undue details or specificity. In matters of bioethics, this strategy is of crucial
importance for the following basic reasons. First, too detailed a piece of legislation
runs the risk ofbecoming rapidly obsolete and more particularly so in biomedical
matters where things evolve very rapidly. Second, legislating in broad general
terms allows for a more flexible normativity and a better adaptation of the law to
the constant evolution of society.
Third, and I must admit that this may sound as a paradox, I believe that the
civilian type of legislation does in fact give an increased creative role to the
judiciary. Frangois G6ny made that point in his criticism of the "exegetic" school
in France, although not in the context of a comparison between the civilian and
common law approach to legislative drafting.
The civilian type of legislation is drafted in general and abstract terms. It
leaves to courts the task of applying a given system of normativity to particular
factual situations but always by reference to and in harmony with predefined broad
principles. The absence ofdetailed norms and specific definitions of terminology,
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that are often found in a typical statutory type of legislation, avoids putting the
judge in an interpretative straightjacket and thus prevents a restrictive black letter
interpretation of the law.
I will conclude and leave you with two remarks that reflect on my part a deep
growing concern.
First, there is a recent tendency, perhaps more vocal in North America, to
legitimize the commercialization of the human body. In classical civilian analysis,
the dichotomy between things (objects) and individuals or persons (subjects) is well
recognized. A number of very important consequences is derived from this
distinction: a human person cannot be treated as a thing nor can his body or even
parts of his body be so treated.
The principle of gratuitousness of gifts or donations of human body parts,
which are "hors commerce" as the French would say, is well settled in Europe, but
subject to intense debate here in North America. Why, it is argued, should a person
not be free to sell a kidney to the highest bidder? Why should a laboratory be
prevented from taking a patent on a human gene? The economic market forces and
the pressure on politicians in that respect are both vocal and important. Yet, I
believe that we have to resist them strongly. Should we do not do so, the
commercialization of the human body will inevitably, in my opinion, blur the
fundamental distinction between persons and things and lead to serious ethical
abuses and finally to the degradation and desacralization of the human person.
My second concern is to see biomedical sciences being used as a simple
instrument for the satisfaction ofever expanding human desires and fantasies. This
danger is already present in two particular areas. The first is that ofnew techniques
of human procreation. The tendency there is to brand as ethical and thus
permissible any method that will lead to the birth of a child for an infertile couple.
The satisfaction of this perfectly legitimate human desire by any procedure or by
any means cannot simply be legally and ethically endorsed. If there is a right to
have a family, there is no right to a child, for the rights of the child have to be
considered. The second, which will, in the years to come, take considerable
expansion is that of genetics. The demand will certainly increase for the
"manufacturing" of the perfect child with a strong genetic pool who will satisfy all
the emotional fantasies ofthe parents. This would lead not only to positive but also
negative eugenics, and potentially to the freezing of the evolution of mankind and
of the human race.
It is the moral responsibility of all ofus to resist the imposition of solutions to
ethical problems raised by science through strict economic criteria on the one band
and, on the other, to send to our respective legislators a clear message that law
should not simply and purely endorse the satisfaction ofhuman desires without first
putting them in perspective.

